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a b s t r a c t
We conduct an experiment to determine how the correspondence between economic rewards and effort, as opposed to luck, affects subjects' ex post voting over redistribution. We ﬁnd that a large, statistically signiﬁcant proportion of both high- and low-payoff voters are willing to vote contrary to their self-interest in favor of groups
that exert proportionately more effort. We conﬁrm these results in an additional, distinct sample. We also
show that when subjects' own effort is greater than the group's average effort level, they exhibit greater selfinterest in voting for redistribution compared to subjects whose effort is below average. Our results have implications for both understanding individual redistributive preferences and group voting behavior.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
There is a strong, positive correlation between the degree to which a
country's citizens believe that luck is the primary factor in determining
income and a country's level of social welfare spending (Alesina et al.,
2001). Theoretically, this relationship can be rationalized in a model
with multiple equilibria driven by divergent, self-conﬁrming beliefs
about the role of luck versus effort in achieving labor market success
(Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole,
2006). These theories can be used to explain, for example, differences
in redistribution levels between the United States and Western
Europe. In one equilibrium, individuals believe in the primacy of effort
in determining income and vote for lower tax rates. In another equilibrium, people believe in the primacy of luck in determining income and
vote for higher tax rates. In both equilibria, the voted tax rate leads to
an income-generating process consistent with the equilibrium belief.
These country-level models illustrate a speciﬁc mechanism through
which ascribing income differences to luck, rather than effort, can
have important consequences.
This correlation between beliefs about the role of effort in creating
income disparities and support for income redistribution may not
have a causal interpretation. The absence of plausibly exogenous
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variation in such beliefs across countries has resulted in a lack of convincing evidence on this point. Without such evidence it is possible
that both beliefs about the relative importance of effort and luck and
the level of income redistribution are driven by other factors, such as
differences in culture or political institutions. While we cannot evaluate
causal claims about these cross-country correlations, the analogous behaviors of individuals are potentially observable in a laboratory context.
We show that changing beliefs about the roles of luck and effort in
determining income alters voting for redistribution in an experimental
setting. Speciﬁcally, we randomly assign subjects to receive either a
high or low payment in exchange for performing a real-effort task. In
one treatment, high-reward subjects perform more iterations of the
task than low-reward subjects, making rewards proportional to effort.
In another treatment, both high- and low-reward subjects expend
equal effort. Hence, rewards are due to luck and unrelated to relative effort. After performing the task, the subjects vote over redistributing income from the high-reward group to the low-reward group. By
comparing the voting of subjects in these two treatments, we can determine if subjects vote for less redistribution when rewards are proportional to effort. We ﬁnd that the subjects' voting for redistribution
cannot be completely explained by their self-interest or by general
other-regarding behavior. About a quarter of both high- and lowreward subjects vote for greater redistribution when rewards are unrelated to effort than when rewards are proportional to effort.
Additionally, we show that subjects base their voting for redistribution not only on the average effort levels of the high- and low-reward
groups but also on their individual effort level. In a third treatment, subjects are randomly assigned to high- or low-reward groups. Within each
reward group, individuals are randomized to complete either a large or
small number of task iterations. In the high-reward group, those
assigned high effort vote for less redistribution than those assigned
low effort. On the other hand, within the low-reward group, subjects
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vote for more redistribution if they are randomized to expend high effort. This suggests that differences in the average effort level of the reward groups are insufﬁcient to explain individual voting behavior. The
subjects also reference their own personal level of effort when determining how to vote on redistribution. In particular, they vote to make
their own payoff more commensurate with their assigned effort.
Our experiment provides a number of important contributions to
the literature. First, unlike previous studies, our treatment randomly assigns effort, an observable output quantity. Through the random assignment of effort, we avoid the tournaments, quiz tasks, and other
performance-based games that form the basis of the prior literature.
Such tasks may conﬂate effort with skill. Skill cannot be randomly
assigned and may be correlated with redistributive voting preferences
through other channels. Such a correlation could be a source of bias in
prior studies. Second, unlike much of the prior literature, we precisely
measure the voting response of all participants, rather than just contest
winners. This is important, as we ﬁnd that even those who receive low
rewards vote for less redistribution when rewards are proportional to
effort.
Another novel feature of our experiment, relative to past studies on
similar questions, is our use of remote online delivery software to conduct the experiment, rather than using a traditional campus laboratory
environment. Because our experimental design requires an assigned but
variable amount of effort from participants, the use of a laboratory setting is impractical. Using a laboratory for this experiment would require
subjects that complete the assigned tasks most quickly to sit around
waiting for others to ﬁnish. Given this waiting time, it would not be
clear if those assigned fewer tasks should feel they had provided less effort relative to those assigned more. Online delivery also allows relatively large samples of subjects to perform the experiment in a short
amount of time when compared to traditional laboratory settings. This
large sample allows for greater statistical precision relative to previous
studies.
Additionally, this paper is novel in using an ex post voting mechanism to redistribute actual income in order to measure the effects of effort versus luck on support for redistribution, Prior studies concerning
the effect of effort on income redistribution often forego voting. Instead,
they concentrate on measuring the extent of voluntary donations via
mechanisms such as the dictator game, charitable transfers, or investment in public goods. Studies that actually require subjects to vote
over redistribution, when income may be determined by luck or effort,
typically use ex ante voting in hypothetical situations.
Finally, our paper takes the uncommon step of replicating our key
ﬁndings in a different sample drawn from a separate subject pool. Recent research suggests that one-third of laboratory experiments published in recent years in the top general interest journals in Economics
are not replicable in new samples (Camerer et al., 2016). Thus we feel
that it is important to conﬁrm that our results are not due to a fortunately drawn sample.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes
the experimental protocol and the related strands of the experimental
literature. Section 3 presents the data, and Section 4 describes the experimental results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental background and protocol
2.1. Experimental design
Our experiment is designed to observe how both high-reward and
low-reward subjects' voting over redistribution varies with differences
in the amount of effort assigned to the two groups. The primary experiment consists of two parts, and both parts are presented to the subjects
during the instructions stage. The complete experimental protocol and
instructions can be found in the Appendices.
In part 1, each subject has to encode four-letter words into numbers
based on a table that provides a random number for each of the letters of

the alphabet. This encoding task was ﬁrst introduced in an experiment
designed to elicit subject effort by Erkal et al. (2011). The task has
been found to be both gender neutral (Kuhn and Villeval, 2015) and
not subject to learning by doing effects (Charness et al., 2013).
In our experiment, the number of words that each subject has to encode correctly as well as the exact payment he receives for completing
the task differs across the three treatments. Subjects in each treatment
are randomized into groups within that treatment, as described below:
Treatment 1: Half the subjects are assigned to encode 50 words correctly for $4; the other half encode 25 words correctly for $2.
Treatment 2: Half the subjects are assigned to encode 50 words for
$4; the other half encode 50 words correctly for $2.
Treatment 3: One-fourth of the subjects are assigned to encode 25
words correctly for $4; one-fourth encode 50 words correctly for $4;
one-fourth encode 25 words correctly for $2; and the last one-fourth
encode 50 words correctly for $2.
In contrast to prior studies that use a tournament to elicit differing
levels of subject effort, all subjects within a group exchange a certain
amount of effort for a certain prospective payment. We also inform subjects of the exact distribution of both effort and rewards in their
assigned treatment group. The ﬁrst treatment effectively establishes a
proportional reward system by creating a low-reward group and then
assigning twice the reward and effort to the high-reward group.
The second treatment creates a ﬂat-effort, randomized reward system. This may seem equivalent to randomly assigning a higher reward
entirely due to luck, as is often done in other experiments. However,
the important difference is that all participants are then required to actually exert the same effort to earn the randomly determined reward.
This may magnify the perception, among both groups, that the lowreward group deserves the same payoff as the high-reward group due
to their equal effort.
The third treatment is a variation on the second in which the reward
groups exert the same effort on average but in which there is individual
variation in effort levels. In other words, it eliminates the deterministic
link between reward and group effort.
In part 2 of the experiment, subjects, with full knowledge of their
payoffs from part 1, are asked to choose an amount that will be taxed
from participants who receive a high payoff ($4) and given to those
with a low payoff ($2). Possible choices are presented in 50-cent increments, with a table indicating the ﬁnal allocation of money to highpayoff individuals versus low-payoff individuals. Subjects are not
allowed to redistribute beyond the full-equality outcome. Thus their
functional choice is to vote to take $0, $0.50, or $1 from each highpayoff individual and give that amount to each low-payoff individual.
After everyone indicates their preferred tax amount, the median
amount is implemented. The subjects then complete an exit questionnaire intended to collect their demographic information.1 Upon the conclusion of the experiment, subjects are paid their ﬁnal earnings.
Table 1 shows the organization of the experimental treatment
groups and their assigned effort and rewards, as well as the sample
sources discussed below and the observed choices of the participants.
For convenience in presenting the results, we divide the treatments
into two classes. In treatments 1 and 2, all subjects with a given reward
exert the same amount of effort. We call these homogenous classes. In
contrast, in treatment 3, subjects may receive the same reward for
exerting different amounts of effort. We call this a heterogeneous class.
The central idea behind the experiment can be seen by comparing
the ﬁrst two treatments. In treatment 1, the rewards provided are proportional to the effort required of the two groups. In contrast, treatment
2 randomly assigns a higher reward to some workers, even though all
exert equal effort. In both treatments 1 and 2, self-interest motivates
high-reward subjects to vote for no redistribution and low-reward subjects to vote for full redistribution. However, if subjects' redistributive
1
Each demographic questionnaire follows the corresponding experimental protocol in
the appendices.
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Table 1
Experimental design.
Class

Treatment

Sample

N

Reward group

Effort level

Observed choices

Homogenous (same effort for reward group)

1.

Amazon MTurk

61

High ($4)

High (50 words)

55

Low ($2)

Low (25 words)

95

High ($8)

High (50 words)

113

Low ($4)

Low (25 words)

63

High ($4)

High (50 words)

59

Low ($2)

High (50 words)

117

High ($8)

High (50 words)

96

Low ($4)

High (50 words)

No redistribution ($0)
Half redistribution (−$0.50)
Full redistribution (−$1.00)
No redistribution ($0)
Half redistribution (+$0.50)
Full redistribution (+$1.00)
No redistribution (0)
Half redistribution (−$1.00)
Full redistribution (−$2.00)
No redistribution (0)
Half redistribution (+$1.00)
Full redistribution (+$2.00)
No redistribution ($0)
Half redistribution (−$0.50)
Full redistribution (−$1.00)
No redistribution ($0)
Half redistribution (+$0.50)
Full redistribution (+$1.00)
No redistribution (0)
Half redistribution (−$1.00)
Full redistribution (−$2.00)
No redistribution (0)
Half redistribution (+$1.00)
Full redistribution (+$2.00)

401

High ($4)

406

Low ($2)

Mixed
Half High (50 words)
Half Low (25 words)
Mixed
Half High (50 words)
Half Low (25 words)

BYU Students

2.

Amazon MTurk

BYU Students

Heterogenous (mixed effort for reward group)

3.

Amazon MTurk

No redistribution ($0)
Half redistribution (−$0.50)
Full redistribution (−$1.00)
No redistribution ($0)
Half redistribution (+$0.50)
Full redistribution (+$1.00)

Notes to Table 1: The table summarizes the experimental samples and the properties of each treatment group, as discussed in Section 2. It also lists the relevant choices observed for each
group.

voting can be causally manipulated by changing the degree to which
they believe given rewards are deserved, we would expect that both
types of subjects will vote for higher levels of redistribution in treatment
2. Those assigned a high payoff will vote for more redistribution in treatment 2 because they see low-payoff subjects exerting the same effort.
Similarly, we expect that low-reward subjects will vote for less redistribution in the ﬁrst treatment, when rewards are clearly proportional to
effort, than in treatment 2, where their relative effort exceeds their relative payoff.
This idea that preferences for redistribution depend on the perception of relative deservedness leads us to further inquire into the process
by which such judgments are made. In the ﬁrst two treatments there is
no variance of effort within a reward group. Thus, a subject might be
changing his voting behavior solely due to differences in perceived deservedness between the reward groups, or alternatively might be comparing his own personal deservedness with that of the other group, or
some combination of the two. Though these are functionally the same
in the experiment so far, they are likely to generate different patterns
of behavior in a real voting environment where there is almost always
variation in effort among those receiving a given reward.
In order to examine these alternatives, we expand the experiment to
consider treatment 3, a situation in which a given reward does not always come from the same level of effort. In this treatment, the groups,
on average, exert the same level of effort for different rewards, much
like in treatment 2. However, individuals do not exert the average
level of effort—they either exert more or less. If a participant simply is
comparing the difference in average group effort, she should vote in a
similar pattern to treatment 2. However, if a subject evaluates her deservedness by comparing her effort level to the average, we should
see different voting behavior by effort level within a reward group. Speciﬁcally, within the high-reward group, high-effort subjects would vote
for less redistribution than low-effort subjects. Conversely, within the
low-reward group, high-effort subjects would vote for more redistribution than low-effort subjects.

2.2. Experimental samples
Our primary experimental sample is drawn from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online labor market and an important
platform for conducting social science research, including economics
experiments (Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al., 2011; Berinsky et al.,
2012; Rand, 2012; Crump et al., 2013). More recently, Kuziemko et al.
(2015) use the MTurk platform to test how the attitudes of subjects toward redistribution change with new information.
We recruit a total of 1180 MTurk workers to participate in our experiment. Respondents follow a hyperlink to our experiment, which is
housed on Qualtrics and programmed using Javascript. Subjects are
free to drop out at any time during the experiment but are only paid
upon completion. An average person takes approximately 20 min to
complete the experiment and is paid $3.
This use of an online subject pool together with the remote delivery
of the experiment provides both advantages and costs when compared
with more traditional laboratory experimental settings. In particular, it
allows experimenters to relax the physical constraints imposed by the
laboratory and the need to bring a suitable group of subjects simultaneously into physical proximity. Furthermore, it reduces the incidental
costs of participation for many subjects and allows for recruitment of
a broader spectrum of participants than those in a typical university
community. It eliminates any pressure or expectations the subjects
feel from being in close physical proximity with each other. It also reduces the possibility of an experimenter demand effect. In this experiment, the online setting is particularly important since it allows us to
assign potentially asynchronous treatments of varying duration and to
more easily recruit large sample sizes.
The largest potential costs of using this subject pool and online delivery come from the possibility that it might lead to greater confusion,
misunderstandings, or impersonation. Because we lack the ability to observe participants, there is less opportunity than in laboratory settings
to monitor the subjects and provide help when they are confused or
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do not understand instructions. This problem may be ampliﬁed if the
participant pool skews heavily toward non-native English speakers.
Furthermore, there is the possibility that online programs, or bots, will
attempt to impersonate humans and participate in the experiment.
To address these concerns we implement several sample validation
procedures. First, we restrict the survey to workers who reside in the
US and ask the respondents to conﬁrm their residency.2 Second, we implement a prescreening measure in order to prevent MTurkers from
completing the experiment more than once and a CAPTCHA feature to
exclude non-human participants. Finally, to ensure each subject's understanding of the instructions, we include multiple comprehension
checks in the experiment. These checks require the subject to answer
hypothetical questions about the consequences of particular voting
choices.
The other possible problem with the online delivery of the experiment is the potential for increased attrition. In an online setting, the
subject can end her experimental participation by merely choosing to
close a browser window. In a laboratory setting, it is more costly for subjects to leave once the experiment has begun. The particular worry in
our experiment is that the attrition may vary by assigned treatment status, calling our results into question.
Of the 1180 subjects that were randomized into a treatment group,
1045 completed the session. This represents an attrition rate of 11%. Regression analysis conﬁrms that there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between failing to complete the experiment and the
randomly assigned treatment condition, meaning the payoff-effort
combination. Because our MTurk experiment involves sample sizes
greater than those in the prior literature, we are able to produce more
precise estimates of the effects of relative effort on redistribution than
previous studies.
In order to test the robustness of our results, we also use standard
procedures to recruit a conﬁrmatory sample of students from Brigham
Young University (BYU).3 For this sample, our experimental design is
identical to that described above with the following exceptions. First,
each of the payment amounts is doubled to account for the higher compensation typical for university subjects and to reﬂect the higher costs of
appearing in person to receive payment. Second, the possible tax
amounts over which the subjects voted are also doubled and now presented in whole-dollar increments. Each subject can vote to take $0,
$1, or $2 from each of the high earners in his experimental treatment
session and give the corresponding amount to the low earners. The latter choice is a vote for full equality of outcomes, or $6 for each participant. The exit questionnaire is also modiﬁed for the university sample
to elicit more relevant demographic information for this particular
group. The full experimental protocol can be seen in the appendices. Because we have a smaller number of subjects available in the university
sample than in the MTurk sample, we lack the power necessary to investigate the contrasts in treatment 3. Thus, we present university results only for treatments 1 and 2.
Of the 477 BYU students that were assigned to a treatment group,
421 completed the experiment and voted on tax levels. In treatment
1, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in attrition rates between

2
To discourage foreign workers even further, we administer our survey during the normal business hours of US EST.
3
An anonymous reviewer raised concerns that the results of the MTurk experiment
may have been driven by subjects misunderstanding how their voting choices would affect the outcome of the experiment. To address this concern, 274 of the 421 students in
the university sample are given augmented instructions and practice. This includes adding
a paragraph deﬁning the median and showing an example of how it might be calculated in
the context of this experiment. Additionally, students practice voting under some hypothetical situations. In each case the subject voting is followed by comprehension questions
to ensure the students can identify how their vote affects the median outcome and hence
the payoff for both low and high earners in the hypothetical example. The hypothetical
scenarios are presented to the subjects in random order to avoid potential priming effects.
The results are statistically the same as for university students given standard instructions,
thus we present the pooled results for all BYU students in the paper.

those assigned to high- and low-payoff groups. In treatment 2, the attrition rate is markedly lower for the high-payoff group (4.9%) than for the
low-payoff group (14.9%) or for either of the treatment 1 groups. These
differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level. However, this differential attrition is incapable of fully explaining the difference
in observed voting patterns. To verify this, we evaluate what the voting
results would be if we removed enough votes for full redistribution
from the high-reward group in treatment 2 to make the attrition rates
of the high- and low-reward groups match. This is equivalent to the extreme assumption that all the extra participants in the high-reward
group vote for full redistribution. Even under this least favorable assumption, the signiﬁcant differences in voting patterns we describe in
Table 4 remain. Consequently, it does not appear that the results are
an artifact of attrition.

2.3. Previous experimental evidence
There is a related experimental literature demonstrating that laboratory subjects display different levels of other-regarding behavior when
they feel that payoffs are earned as opposed to randomly assigned.
However, the design of these experiments makes it hard to draw clear
inferences about the effects of effort on redistributive voting in realworld situations. In particular, most studies are based on games that
do not necessarily resemble the political economy problem of voting
on redistribution, such as the dictator game (Hoffman et al., 1994;
Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Cherry and Shogren,
2008; Carlsson et al., 2013; Rey-Biel et al., 2016), public goods games
(Cherry et al., 2005; Kroll et al., 2007; Balafoutas et al., 2013), or
games which solicit charitable giving (Erkal et al., 2011; Reinstein and
Riener, 2012). Of the studies that consider actual voting mechanims,
many focus on hypothetical or ex ante voting by subjects with no
knowledge of their relative ﬁnancial standing (Schildberg-Hörisch,
2010; Krawczyk, 2010; Durante et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the previous literature generally uses tournaments,
quizzes, or other competitive games to determine pre-redistribution
payoffs (Krawczyk, 2010; Erkal et al., 2011; Durante et al., 2014; Gee
et al., 2015). Such tasks may conﬂate the effects of effort with skill, generating bias in the results. Alhough these papers often ﬁnd evidence that
some experimental subjects vote for less redistribution when payoffs
are determined by skill rather than randomly assigned, small sample
sizes relative to the number of treatments mean that these results are
usually imprecisely estimated and cannot be identiﬁed for some groups
of participants.
In contrast with these studies we explicitly consider the effects of effort versus luck on ex-post voting behavior when effort levels are randomly assigned.4 Our experimental sample is large enough to allow us
to identify small changes in voting behavior in both the high- and
low-rewards groups. Additionally, the third treatment of our experiment allows us to investigate a novel question: what is the role of a subject's personal experience, in addition to her group experience, in
determining her preferences for redistribution? Speciﬁcally, we examine whether someone expending a certain level of effort would change
voting decisions if she switches from a low to a high payoff.

4
There are other experimental studies that use ex-post voting mechanisms to redistribute income. They are not, however, primarily concerned with testing the relationship of
effort, luck, and voting as we are here. For example, both Agranov and Palfrey (2015)
and Grosser and Reuben (2013) use ex post voting for redistribution but are primarily concerned with efﬁciency losses, the former study through endogenous labor supply choices
and the latter through double auction trading. Esarey et al. (2012) are interested in whether subjects' ideological views or statements about preferences for fairness actually predict
their voting behavior. They reject such factors in explaining voting. The closest these studies come to the topic of the present paper is the conﬁrmation of the Agranov and Palfrey
(2015) study that less equal wage rates lead to more redistribution in a setting with endogenous labor supply choices.
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3. Data and summary statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for subjects assigned to treatments 1 or 2, the homogenous effort classes. Panel A considers the
238 MTurk workers assigned to treatments 1 or 2. As might be expected
from a group recruited via computer through a service maintained by a
large Internet retailer, the group is relatively younger on average (age
34 years) than the US voting-age population as a whole. Additionally,
relative to the US voting-age population, blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented in the sample while Asians and whites are overrepresented. More importantly, perhaps, for the experiment at hand, the
group also appears to have a much higher proportion of subjects that
self-identify with the Democratic party and a much lower proportion
that identify with the Republican party than in the US voting-age
population.
The ﬁnal column of the table conﬁrms the success of the randomization by providing p-values for the joint test of equality across the four
treatment group means for each variable. In all cases we fail to reject
the null hypothesis of equality of averages across the different treatment groups at the ﬁve-percent level. We also use a seemingly unrelated regressions framework to simultaneously test the balance of all
covariates in each sample. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of balanced covariates with a p-value of 0.45. While successful randomization
ensures the internal validity of our ﬁndings, there may be some concern
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that MTurk subjects may differ in important ways from the larger population, threatening external validity. In particular, the descriptive statistics suggest that the political views of this group may be different in
ways that might be important in thinking about willingness to vote
for income redistribution.
To ensure the broader applicability of our results, we replicate treatments 1 and 2 with a different subject pool, undergraduate students recruited from Brigham Young University. Although this group also skews
young and white, it is much more conservative in its political views.
Panel B of the table provides similar comparisons for the students in
the university sample. Again, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
all the treatment groups have equal means in subject characteristics
both singly and jointly. The joint test across all treatment groups and
characteristics produces a p-value of 0.23.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the MTurk workers assigned
to heterogeneous effort classes—that is—assigned to treatment 3. On average, this group looks very similar to the MTurk workers depicted in
Table 2. This seems natural as they are drawn from the same experimental pool. When jointly testing simultaneously for balance across
all covariates, we fail to reject the balanced hypothesis with a p-value
of 0.25. When considering the average values of each single covariate
across treatment groups, we ﬁnd no cases in which we would reject
the null hypothesis of equal averages at a ﬁve-percent level. Across
both Tables 1 and 2, we would reject only four of the 31 covariate

Table 2
Summary statistics of subjects by treatment status—homogenous effort classes.
Variable

A. Amazon MTurk sample
Female
Age
Married
White
Asian
Hispanic
Black
Other ethnicity
NMedian income
Employed
Student
Republican
Democrat
Sample size

Treatment 1

Treatment 2

Overall mean

High reward

Low reward

High reward

Low reward

0.45
(0.50)
33.90
(10.78)
0.35
(0.48)
0.76
(0.43)
0.08
(0.26)
0.08
(0.26)
0.07
(0.25)
0.02
(0.16)
0.47
(0.50)
0.66
(0.47)
0.12
(0.32)
0.16
(0.36)
0.46
(0.50)
238

0.54
(0.50)
34.22
(10.15)
0.39
(0.49)
0.79
(0.41)
0.07
(0.25)
0.05
(0.22)
0.07
(0.25)
0.03
(0.18)
0.57
(0.50)
0.62
(0.49)
0.15
(0.36)
0.08
(0.28)
0.49
(0.50)
61

0.42
(0.50)
35.13
(13.24)
0.25
(0.44)
0.78
(0.42)
0.09
(0.29)
0.07
(0.26)
0.04
(0.19)
0.02
(0.13)
0.40
(0.49)
0.75
(0.44)
0.09
(0.29)
0.11
(0.31)
0.55
(0.50)
55

0.44
(0.50)
34.17
(11.27)
0.35
(0.48)
0.70
(0.46)
0.05
(0.21)
0.13
(0.34)
0.08
(0.27)
0.05
(0.21)
0.44
(0.50)
0.65
(0.48)
0.11
(0.32)
0.21
(0.41)
0.39
(0.49)
63

0.39
(0.49)
32.15
(10.54)
0.39
(0.49)
0.76
(0.43)
0.10
(0.30)
0.05
(0.22)
0.08
(0.28)
0.00
(0.00)
0.44
(0.50)
0.63
(0.49)
0.12
(0.33)
0.22
(0.42)
0.42
(0.50)
59

0.49
(0.50)
21.54
(2.55)
0.18
(0.39)
0.88
(0.32)
3.58
(0.37)
95

0.43
(0.49)
22.26
(3.32)
0.25
(0.43)
0.81
(0.39)
3.57
(0.40)
113

0.45
(0.50)
21.70
(2.10)
0.34
(0.47)
0.85
(0.35)
3.52
(0.44)
117

0.46
(0.50)
22.38
(8.12)
0.25
(0.44)
0.82
(0.38)
3.53
(0.37)
96

B. University student sample
Female
0.46
(0.50)
Age
21.97
(4.55)
Married
0.26
(0.44)
White
0.84
(0.36)
GPA
3.55
(0.40)
Sample size
421

P-value
Equal means

0.38
0.54
0.33
0.68
0.65
0.43
0.65
0.39
0.25
0.44
0.83
0.07
0.32

0.86
0.28
0.07
0.54
0.54

Notes for Table 2: Standard deviations are in parentheses below means. Joint tests for simultaneous equality of all covariate means across the treatment groups produce p-values of 0.45 for
the MTurk sample and 0.23 for the university sample.
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Table 3
Summary statistics of Mechanical Turk subjects by treatment status—heterogeneous effort classes.
Variable

High reward

Female
Age
Married
White
Asian
Hispanic
Black
Other ethnicity
N Median income
Employed
Student
Republican
Democrat
Sample size

Low reward

Overall mean

50 questions

25 questions

50 questions

25 questions

0.48
(0.50)
33.45
(10.80)
0.34
(0.48)
0.81
(0.39)
0.07
(0.25)
0.04
(0.20)
0.06
(0.24)
0.02
(0.14)
0.50
(0.50)
0.70
(0.46)
0.08
(0.27)
0.14
(0.34)
0.44
(0.50)
807

0.47
(0.50)
34.85
(11.05)
0.35
(0.48)
0.81
(0.39)
0.07
(0.25)
0.06
(0.23)
0.05
(0.21)
0.02
(0.14)
0.57
(0.50)
0.73
(0.45)
0.06
(0.23)
0.14
(0.35)
0.41
(0.49)
207

0.50
(0.50)
32.75
(10.89)
0.36
(0.48)
0.80
(0.40)
0.07
(0.26)
0.04
(0.19)
0.07
(0.25)
0.02
(0.15)
0.43
(0.50)
0.68
(0.47)
0.11
(0.32)
0.12
(0.33)
0.44
(0.50)
194

0.45
(0.50)
33.90
(11.55)
0.34
(0.47)
0.81
(0.39)
0.05
(0.21)
0.05
(0.21)
0.08
(0.27)
0.02
(0.14)
0.51
(0.50)
0.70
(0.46)
0.06
(0.23)
0.11
(0.32)
0.45
(0.50)
208

0.51
(0.50)
32.40
(9.58)
0.33
(0.47)
0.83
(0.38)
0.08
(0.27)
0.02
(0.15)
0.05
(0.22)
0.01
(0.10)
0.48
(0.50)
0.68
(0.47)
0.10
(0.30)
0.16
(0.37)
0.44
(0.50)
198

P-value
Equal means
0.54
0.09
0.95
0.83
0.44
0.36
0.50
0.61
0.06
0.66
0.10
0.42
0.88

Notes to Table 3: Standard deviations are in parentheses below means. A joint test for simultaneous equality of all covariate means across the treatment groups produces a p-value of 0.25.

equality hypotheses at the ten-percent level. Thus we conclude that the
equality tests in both tables are in line with what we would expect from
a successful randomization. As an added precaution, we also present
covariate-adjusted results in our analysis tables.

4. Results
4.1. Evidence on the effect of relative effort on voting for redistribution
We begin by considering the differences in redistributive voting
preferences among MTurk workers randomly assigned to the levels of
effort and reward previously described as treatments 1 and 2. In each
treatment voters are asked to choose an amount of money that will be
taken from each high-reward participant and given to each lowreward participant. The possible choices are $0, $0.50, or $1.

A summary of their choices can be found in Figs. 1 and 2, the ﬁrst of
which shows voting by the high-reward subjects under each scenario,
while the second presents the analogous results for the low-reward
subjects. For each possible redistribution choice, the top bar represents
the fraction of each MTurk reward group that votes for that option in
treatment 1. The second bar gives the same information for treatment 2.
It appears that about two-thirds of the MTurk subjects consistently
display complete self-interest in voting. That is, they vote for the alternative that maximizes their personal payoff in all situations. Interestingly, this number is almost identical for those assigned to high- and to
low-payoff groups, even though that difference in self-interest leads
them to vote in opposite directions. This can be seen by examining the
voting behavior of the low-reward subjects in the scenario when they
exert less effort (treatment 1) and also by the high-reward subjects in
the scenario in which they exert equal effort (treatment 2). This symmetry of self-interest may hold precisely because our subjects receive

Redistribution to Equality

Redistribution to Equality

Half-redistribution

Half-redistribution

No redistribution

No redistribution

0

0.2

Treatment 1 - Mturk Sample

0.4

0.6

0.8

Treatment 2 - Mturk Sample

Treatment 1 - University Sample Treatment 2 - University Sample
Fig. 1. Effort and voting by the high-reward subjects.

1

0

0.2

Treatment 1 - Mturk Sample

0.4

0.6

0.8

Treatment 2 - Mturk Sample

Treatment 1 - University Sample Treatment 2 - University Sample
Fig. 2. Effort and voting by the low-reward subjects.
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a high or low payoff by random assignment. In the population it may be
the case that self-interested preferences make one more likely to belong
to one of the income groups. In fact, this underlying experimental symmetry suggests that further research might be able to determine the degree to which self-interest leads to income differences by examining
how much real-world income groups depart from the symmetric
outcome.
Furthermore, about 10% of subjects consistently show unconditional
other-regarding behavior. Namely, some low-payoff subjects vote for
less than maximal redistribution and some high-payoff subjects vote
for positive redistribution, regardless of their assigned effort level.
Most important for the present study, the remaining quarter of the
participants exhibit voting behavior that appears to change according
to differences in relative effort levels of the two payoff groups in a
way consistent with rewarding effort. Interestingly, the perception of
deserved rewards does not only work to reinforce self-interest, although it may do so. It also works to reduce a reward group's selfinterested voting when such voting would weaken the link between relative effort and payoffs. Thus, when high-reward subjects exert more effort, 92% of them select no redistribution. This is about 27 percentage
points greater than the fraction of high-reward voters who favor no redistribution under equal-effort situations. Meanwhile, transitioning from
a regime in which high-payoff subjects exert equal effort to one in which
they exert more leads the share of low-payoff subjects voting for full redistribution to fall from 93% to 67%, a change of 26 percentage points. The
symmetry of this effect is interesting and previously unremarked.
To address potential concerns about external validity, we replicate
these results in a sample of university students. As detailed in the experimental design section, the payment amounts are all doubled in the university sample. We see this as a beneﬁcial feature rather than a problem
as it shows that the experiment produces similar results at different
compensation levels. In considering voting, university subjects have a
choice to redistribute $0, $1, or $2, representing no, partial, and full redistribution, respectively.
In the remainder of Figs. 1 and 2, we show the percentage of university students that make each of these choices. For each option, the third
bar from the top represents the choice of the students in treatment 1
and the bottom bar the choice in treatment 2. When compared with
the MTurk workers, the university students demonstrate less self-
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interest in their voting choices. High-payoff university students vote
for proportionally more redistribution than the MTurk workers, while
low-payoff university students generally vote for less. These differences
between the university and MTurk samples are both statistically significant at a 5% level. While understanding the source of these differences
is not a primary purpose of the study, it is possible that the relative
youthfulness of the university subjects contributes to their greater generosity. Additionally, MTurk workers may view the experiment as part
of their job, rather than an extracurricular bonus, and subsequently attach greater importance to a high payoff.
More importantly, the relative patterns of voting within the two
samples are quite similar. A majority of subjects always engage in selfinterested behavior, a small number always choose other-regarding behavior, and a larger group, about a quarter in both cases, vote to favor
the group whose effort has not been proportionately rewarded.
We provide a more formal analysis of these results in Table 4. The
ﬁrst two columns represent the average amount each effort-reward
group votes to redistribute. Thus, the high-payoff MTurk subjects vote
for six cents of redistribution, on average, in treatment 1, compared to
29 cents in treatment 2. Beginning with panel A, the contrast between
the results of the ﬁrst two columns is instructive. In each column, one
of the reward groups sees a coincidence of self-interest and deservedness. Thus in column 1, the high-reward subjects are both selfinterested in voting for no redistribution and also feel deserving of the
greater reward due to their greater effort, while in column 2 the lowreward subjects feel self-interested in greater redistribution and feel deserving of greater rewards due to putting forth equal effort.
Column 3 shows the difference in voting going from treatment 1 to
treatment 2. The high-reward group increases average voted redistribution by 23 cents, out of a dollar possible, while the increase among lowreward subjects is 19 cents. These represent large changes in voting behavior. Note that the difference in voted redistribution between the
high- and low-reward groups does not change signiﬁcantly across treatments, as shown by comparing the coefﬁcients in the third row. This is because moving from treatment 1 to treatment 2, in which the low-reward
subjects exert effort disproportionate to their compensation, leads both
reward groups to increase voted redistribution by similar amounts.
The ﬁnal column of the table considers the robustness of the voting
results when they are regression adjusted to account for covariate

Table 4
Mean voted tax amounts by treatment status—homogenous effort classes.
Effort levels

Group
A. Amazon MTurk Sample
High Reward (H)
Low Reward (L)
Difference
Covariate- Adjusted Difference

B. University Student Sample
High Reward (H)
Low Reward (L)
Difference
Covariate- Adjusted Difference

Comparison

Treatment 1

Treatment 2

Treatment 2 - Treatment 1

H: 50 problems
L: 25 problems

H: 50 problems
L: 50 problems

Raw Difference

Covariate- Adjusted

0.06**
(0.03)
0.75**
(0.05)
−0.70**
(0.06)
−0.70**
(0.06)

0.29**
(0.05)
0.95**
(0.03)
−0.66**
(0.06)
−0.67**
(0.06)

0.23**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)

0.20**
(0.06)
0.21**
(0.07)

0.27**
(0.06)
1.30**
(0.08)
−1.03**
(0.10)
−1.02**
(0.10)

0.76**
(0.08)
1.63**
(0.07)
−0.87**
(0.11)
−0.85**
(0.11)

0.49**
(0.10)
0.33**
(0.11)

0.50**
(0.11)
0.33**
(0.11)

Notes to Table 4: Listed amounts are the average voted redistribution amount in dollars for the particular group. Redistribution to full equality would involve an amount of $1 being
redistributed from high- to low-earner groups for the MTurk sample and $2 for the university sample. Subjects have knowledge of only the two groups in their treatment column. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the ﬁve-percent level.
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differences. Unlike previous experiments that consider the relationship
between effort, luck, and generosity, we have experimental control over
the amount of effort exerted. Thus we do not expect there to be omitted
factors correlated both with generosity and the propensity to exert effort in an experiment. Furthermore, the results of our descriptive statistics suggest that there are no signiﬁcant covariate differences across
groups. Indeed, the covariate adjustment does not change the pattern
of results.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the same results for the university sample. The coefﬁcients in the third and fourth columns are roughly double
those in panel A. This is what we could expect given that the rewards are
twice as large among this sample. Taking this into account, the pattern
of results is strikingly similar in the two samples. Both high- and lowreward groups vote for signiﬁcantly more redistribution when the
low-reward group exerts equal effort. The agreement in the general pattern of results across samples suggests that our initial experimental conclusions may be more broadly applicable.
4.2. Heterogeneous effort classes
We have demonstrated that subjects vote to reward groups that are
deserving, in a relative effort sense, in situations where there is a clear
correspondence between effort level and reward. However, it is important to know how much of this is actually driven by the average deservedness imputed to groups. In particular, we suspect that
participants will give more weight to their own experience, rather
than the average effort level of their group, in deciding how to vote
over redistribution.
Treatment 3 tests this possibility. In this treatment, high- and lowreward subjects exert the same average amount of effort, which is common knowledge. If the average effort level of the group is the sole determinant of deservedness, we expect high- and low-reward subjects to
vote in the same manner as in treatment 2. However, if subjects place
weight on their own experience in determining group deservedness,
we expect there to be differences in voting between subjects who
exert different amounts of effort but belong to the same reward group.
Table 5 presents the average level of redistribution voted, in dollars,
by each reward-effort group in Treatment 3. The third column of results
in Table 5 shows that high-reward subjects who exert more effort vote
for a statistically signiﬁcant ten percentage points less redistribution on
average than high-reward subjects who exert less effort. Self-interest,
which is common to all voters, cannot explain this disparity. Rather,
this is strong evidence that high-reward subjects consider not only
that both reward groups exert equal average effort but also take into account how much effort they personally expended. Thus the highreward subjects who exert less personal effort ﬁnd it easier to conclude
that low-reward subjects are deserving of larger transfers.
The opposite pattern is true for low-reward voters. Those who exert
a lower level of effort among these subjects vote for signiﬁcantly lower
levels of redistribution, seven percentage points, than their high-effort

counterparts. This suggests that low-reward voters also consider their
own effort level in determining the deservedness of their group.
Another interesting pattern in the Table 5 results is the greater polarization of voting behavior among the high-effort than the low-effort
subjects, seen in the third row. Because of their higher efforts, both
high- and low-reward subjects are likely to view themselves as deserving of a larger share of the rewards. Thus the most ardent redistributionists do not follow a stereotype of self-interested, low-effort participants
but rather of hard-working, unlucky individuals. Similarly, the least support for redistribution comes not from idle high-reward voters but rather those who receive a high reward and exert high effort levels.
5. Conclusion
In this experiment, we test the idea that individual-level voting for
redistribution is strongly inﬂuenced by disparities between relative effort and rewards. In multiple experimental treatments across two samples, we ﬁnd that about a quarter of subjects vote to make the rewards
for another group more proportionate to relative effort, even when
doing so is in opposition to the voters' self-interest. This behavior is similar in magnitude for both high- and low-reward subjects.
We also test whether subjects are inﬂuenced by their own level of effort as well as the average difference across groups. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant effect of own effort on voting for redistribution. Our results
suggest that some previous conceptions of how attitudes toward effort
matter in redistributive voting are incomplete. Greater effort does not
necessarily lead to a preference for lower taxes and redistribution. Instead, hard work causes both winners and losers to desire a higher personal payoff. This leads to voting for high taxes by hard workers with a
low payoff and low taxes by hard workers with a high payoff.
By experimentally assigning both effort and payoffs, our study provides
unambiguous causal evidence on the impact of relative effort on voting for
redistribution. We execute our study in an ex post voting setting that
mimics existing political economy institutions. We assemble a large dataset
from two different populations that allows us to measure the effects of own
and group relative effort with precision. Thus our study overcomes the potential limitations of omitted variables bias, ex ante voting, dictatorial
allocation mechanisms, and small samples that exist in prior studies.
In our experimental setting there exists an objective, shared reference measure for effort, the number of encoding problems subjects
were required to complete. The establishment of this metric allows us
to predict experimentally which subjects are likely to feel most deserving. In most redistributive voting contexts, there is no common measure
for whether a particular salary or ﬁnancial payoff is merited or not, and
the distribution of effort is not common knowledge. Consequently, an
individual's own experience with luck and effort likely becomes even
more important to voting behavior. Furthermore, without common
knowledge about the joint distribution of effort and income, we depend
on information transmitted through media, friends, relatives, and often
divergent cultural myths to shape our beliefs about how luck and effort

Table 5
Mean voted tax amounts by treatment status for Mechanical Turk sample—heterogeneous effort classes.
Effort level

Comparison

Reward group

50 problems

25 problems

Raw difference

Covariate-adjusted

High reward

0.16**
(0.02)
0.91**
(0.02)
−0.75**
(0.03)
−0.75**
(0.03)

0.27**
(0.03)
0.85**
(0.02)
−0.58**
(0.04)
−0.57**
(0.04)

–0.10**
(0.04)
0.07**
(0.03)

−0.10**
(0.04)
0.07**
(0.03)

Low reward
Difference
Covariate-adjusted difference

Notes to Table 5: Listed amounts are the average voted redistribution amount in dollars for the particular group. Redistribution to full equality would involve an amount of $1 being
redistributed from high- to low-earner groups. Subjects have knowledge of the existence and prevalence of all four effort-reward combination groups. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance
at the ﬁve-percent level.
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interact in determining economic success. Thus, our micro experimental
evidence reinforces the idea that the stories we tell about fairness in society can become self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
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